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Policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs are assumed to have a decisive impact on policy
outcomes. Their access to social and political resources is contingent on their influence on
other agents. In social network analysis (SNA), entrepreneurs are often closely associated
with brokers, because both are agents presumed to benefit from bridging structural holes;
for example, gaining advantage through occupying a strategic position in relational space.
Our aim here is twofold. First, to conceptually and operationally differentiate policy brokers
from policy entrepreneurs premised on assumptions in the policy-process literature; and
second, via SNA, to use the output of core algorithms in a cross-sectional analysis of
political brokerage and political entrepreneurship. We attempt to simplify the use of graph
algebra in answering questions relevant to policy analysis by placing each algorithm within
its theoretical context. In the methodology employed, we first identify actors and graph their
relations of influence within a specific policy event; then we select the most central actors;
and compare their rank in a series of statistics that capture different aspects of their network
advantage. We examine betweenness centrality, positive and negative Bonacich power,
Burt’s effective size and constraint and honest brokerage as paradigmatic. We employ
two case studies to demonstrate the advantages and limitations of each algorithm for
differentiating between brokers and entrepreneurs: one on Swiss climate policy and one
on EU competition and transport policy.
Keywords: policy entrepreneurs; policy brokers; social network analysis
Introduction: agency, brokerage and entrepreneurs
A key interest in policy analysis is to explain the process through which certain
policy outcomes are reached (Howlett, 2002; Knill et al., 2012; Fischer, 2013). To
achieve this, policy analysts attempt to account for all different pathways that
influence policy outcomes (Dür, 2008; Fischer and Sciarini, 2013). One such
pathway concerns the identification of key agents, termed policy entrepreneurs and
brokers, who are said to have a significant impact on decision making and thus able
to shape outputs and outcomes decisively at critical policy junctures (Stokman and
Zeggelink, 1996; Mintrom and Norman, 2009). But how can such exceptional
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agents be identified within the policy process? The aim of this paper is to answer this
question and to also investigate whether their network position offers a specific
policy advantage or reflects such an advantage. We employ formal social network
analysis (SNA) and conduct case study analysis on two sets of empirical data
to answer these questions. In our analysis, we do not directly address the inter-
dependence inherent in a network of relations as both a cause and a reflection
of power inequalities between actors. We, instead, focus our analytic effort on
differentiating between two types of political action that political science hypothe-
sizes are distinct in their impact on political outcomes. This constitutes an important
theoretical contribution because it allows us to problematize how network relations
affect the power of political agents.
The starting point, for both case studies employed, is an extraordinary policy
outcome and a closer inspection of the actions and relations of agents associated
with the relevant event. The network relations of policy actors are important, as an
actor’s relational environment can provide information about constraints and
opportunities available to them. More concretely, we adopt an actor-centered
approach and wish to identify exceptional agents via their relational profile in
a policy network. Mainly, two distinct types of exceptional agents have been
identified in both, the policy and the network literature: entrepreneurs and brokers.
Assumptions for the roles of these actors in the two literatures differ. In the most
influential work on network brokerage (Burt, 2005) brokers are often synonymous
to entrepreneurs,1 and although this assumption is not equivalent to stating that all
entrepreneurs are brokers, the two are often conflated. In policy process theories, on
the other hand, entrepreneurs and brokers are said to play distinct roles that can
have considerable impact on policy outputs (Peters, 1997; Svensson and Öberg,
2006; Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Policy entrepreneurs are said to act in a rather
self-interested and strategic way, while policy brokers to seek stability and feasible
policy outputs (Christopoulos and Ingold, 2011). This then also creates different
expectations on how policy solutions are shaped: while policy brokers try to med-
iate among conflicting coalitions and engineer a compromise solution (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993); policy entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are trying to
promote their interests so that the final outcome reflects their policy preferences
(Kingdon, 2003). Disentangling the two can enhance our understanding of how
such behavioral archetypes impact policy outcomes. We thus assume that although
not all actors will gain advantage from their structural positions, some will occupy
structural positions of privilege. Defined by different centrality algorithms, they can
be associated with different types of network centrality and network brokerage.
We employ the heuristic term ‘exceptional’ to, therefore, exemplify the case
where different types of network structure privilege can be associated with policy
entrepreneurship or policy brokerage.
1 In Burt’s, 2005 work on brokerage, he concentrates on economic agency, where entrepreneurship and
brokerage are closely associated.
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We wish to demonstrate, in this article, that these archetypes of exceptional
agency are reflected in a distinct profile. We borrow insights from former case
studies (see Christopoulos and Quaglia 2009; Ingold and Varone, 2011) and
validate them through graph theoretical network models. In line with Beyers
et al. (2008), we thus combine qualitative (case study analysis) and quantitative
(social network models) approaches in a mixed methods design to gain in depth
understanding on how network positions affect policy outcomes. We have also
developed conceptual and methodological guidelines to suggest a model for formal
network analysis of policy networks as well as highlight key elements of the
distinctiveness of exceptional policy actors.
The article is structured as follows: we first offer a critical review of the literature
on political entrepreneurship and brokerage that places the role of exceptional
agency within political action. This leads us to a review of the constraints and
opportunities of political agency through a network lens. More concretely, we
propose the use of a range of different network measures with complementary
underlying assumptions on the effect of relations on political contest. We explore
whether these network metrics can capture the difference between policy entrepre-
neurs and brokers in policy networks. Two case studies [Swiss Climate policy (SCP)
and EU Competition (EUC) policy] allow us to decouple brokerage and to highlight
the advantages and shortcomings of centrality measures for distinguishing between
policy brokers and entrepreneurs. We conclude with a call for widening existing
theoretical frameworks to incorporate actor relations and for sharpening the meth-
odological tools of policy analysis with the use of method and data triangulation.
Defining brokers and entrepreneurs
Let us first examine prominent claims in the literature. Agents in positions of
structural privilege can induce creativity to the policy process and take an important
role when it comes to policy change by modifying the status quo (Kingdon, 1995:
2005). This is why policy process theories assign such agents a particular role in
shaping policy, with recent interest on policy entrepreneurship strongly associating
these actors with the timing of policy windows (Copeland and James, 2014).
Policy entrepreneurs have been broadly defined as agents that are innovative and
who display a good knowledge of the policy process (ibid.) or a long network
horizon (Christopoulos and Ingold, 2011). Schneider et al. (1995) expound on the
concept of the political entrepreneur as the idea ‘pusher’, indeed the creator of ideas,
noting the importance of discovering and framing opportunities in such a fashion
that create demand for the proposed solution. In that regard, entrepreneurs are said
to be strategic and opportunistic actors (Holcombe, 2002: 143), that are self-
interested and have strong leadership qualities (Arce, 2001: 124). Mintrom and
Vergari (1996) find that policy entrepreneur engagement with a policy network
determines their success, whileMintrom andNorman (2009) consider the integration
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of multiple theoretical streams as paramount for an understanding of the com-
plexity of policy change. The Multiple Streams Framework claims that policy
entrepreneurs succeed in capturing the decision maker’s attention (Zachariadis,
2007: 69); while access to decision makers is the crucial condition for a policy
network to channel policy outputs (Stokman and Zeggelink, 1996). Entrepreneurial
political action is also associated with institutional change (Sheingate, 2003) and
influential in studies of collective action problems (Schneider and Teske, 1992). In
the present study, we focus on regulatory change that can presumably be affected by
the presence of such agents.
Another category of exceptional agents found in the literature are policy
brokers. But a broker is framed differently than an entrepreneur. Brokers have
a prominent place within an Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), where
they are seen as actors seeking stability within specific policy subsystems (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). They appear to connect subsystems where advocacy
coalition groups differ in their beliefs, and where there is conflict about policy
preferences. In such situations, policy brokers can intervene by promoting con-
ciliatory policy solutions and by mediating trust (Svensson and Öberg, 2006).
For instance, they can incentivize coalition members to not activate institutionalized
veto points (Ingold and Varone, 2011). Furthermore, it has been empirically
demonstrated by Ingold and Varone (2011), that brokers need strategies and
some sort of (self-) interest to invest resources and act as mediators within a given
policy process.
The major distinction between entrepreneurs and brokers in the policy literature,
is that entrepreneurs are presumed strongly strategic and self-interested, while
brokers are presumed to seek stability, acting to find feasible policy compromises.
This distinction is not trivial, as both actor types shape policy outcomes differently
and the presence of the one, the other, or both together, would potentially induce
different policy outcomes.
Brokers and entrepreneurs are not defined as personalities, but rather
as roles actors play within a given policy process, at a given time (Mintrom,
2000; McCaffrey and Salerno, 2011). Exceptional agents can thus be identified
through their action and activities in a policy process; and a network perspective
identifies them through their relations and positions in networks of influence.
Their structural position should thus also be reflected in the type of relationships
they cultivate during the policy process: while brokers seek stability and
compromise they need to be transparent and recognized; on the other hand, entre-
preneurs may engage in opportunistic action and strategic relationships that are
most effective if partially concealed from other actors in the network. However,
within the scope of the present study, we can assume a motivational distinc-
tion since, in their idealized form, policy entrepreneurs promote their own interests
and values while policy brokers seek systemic balance. Seeking balance
does not necessarily make policy brokers altruistic but might imply a different
modus operandi.
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A network approach in decoupling brokerage
Whether political agents act as brokers or entrepreneurs depends on their political
acumen as well as on the structure of relations in the policy community within
which they are embedded. Agents that we would expect to singularly affect policy
outcomes (those we identified earlier as exceptional) should hold a privileged
structural position in terms of their ability to influence others. Such positions hold
informational advantage and can amplify their potential to influence others.
As stated by Wasserman and Faust (1994: 171), ‘One of the primary uses of graph
theory in SNA is the identification of the most important actors in a social network’.
SNA offers a toolbox of graph theoretical algorithms that dissect the relational
profile of actors. Advances of SNA in explaining agency has been evident in research
on social movements (Diani and Della Porta, 2005); policy networks (Knoke,
1990); economic action (Jackson, 2010); and economic geography (Barthelt and
Gluckler, 2011). Several scholars have used a network approach to reconstruct
decision-making processes and stakeholder intervention in policy domains (Knoke
et al., 1996; Svensson and Öberg, 2006; Fischer and Sciarini, 2013). Researching a
policy network, via SNA, implies analyzing a policy process via a mathematical
abstraction, where relations can be contingently examined with the actors that are
involved (Henning, 2009; Ginty, 2010). In that respect the method is conducive
to the integration of structure and agency (Christopoulos, 2008), although the
theoretical implications of this integration have not been exhaustively explored
(Emirbayer, 1997). The major theoretical departure of a science of networks is to
model human agency as interdependent. This permits us to account for instrumental
constraints and opportunities to their agency, as well as improve the content validity
of such models.
More concretely, one way of conceptualizing the difference between policy
entrepreneurs and brokers is to identify their relational profile and infer the
underlying behavior that has led to this position in social structure. Put differently,
to distinguish brokers from entrepreneurs in a policy network, we can investigate
the differences in their relational profile considering that policy brokers have
different goals, which reflect in their actions and presumably their position in
relational space. Following their characteristics as outlined above, policy brokers
choose between bridging and bonding roles as their aim is to improve the stability of
the policy environment in the evolving network; while policy entrepreneurs are
defined as more opportunistic actors interested more in policy decisions and outputs
(see Christopoulos and Ingold, 2011).
We now develop this model further acknowledging that although these appear as
distinct ‘ideal-types’, in reality actors cannot be unequivocally boxed in such idea-
lized frames, nor indeed that these can be seen to occupy opposite ends of a beha-
vioral continuum. As argued above, policy brokers can be serving a strategic interest
by investing resources in a mitigating role; or policy entrepreneurs may, for strategic
reasons, assume overt brokerage roles.
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Based on former work, we propose a series of operationalization strategies that
should capture these idealized roles as reflected in these actors’ relational profiles. In
Table 1, we list a series of actor attributes derived from the policy analysis literature
that can be captured through network analysis. However, it should be reiterated
that in an ideal operationalization environment, SNA would be one of multiple
methodological tools utilized to capture agent preferences, actions, constraints,
and opportunities.
The algorithms that we use have their roots in graph theory and the aim
here is to empirically test if they are useful in distinguishing between different
types of agency.
In Appendix I, we outline the algorithms and implications for policy analysis of
the statistics selected. Centrality measures, in general, and betweenness centrality in
particular (see Freeman, 1979) have been successfully employed in identifying those
playing a key role in a policy process (Knoke et al., 1996). Betweenness centrality
identifies actors who are on the shortest path between other actors, those that
potentially control information flows. Both, brokers and entrepreneurs can display
high betweenness centrality: the former linking actors defending different policy
preferences in order to seek stability in the network; the latter in a more opportu-
nistic manner to influence decision making and outputs. Betweenness centrality is
thus used here as a ‘filter’ metric since it combines one-sided dependence with node
importance (see Appendix 1 for algorithmic expressions). More concretely,
betweenness combines a reflection of the degree to which the whole network is
dependent on a specific agent for its cohesion as well as by summing values of all
relevant geodesics and thus remaining a core centrality metric (Brandes et al., 2012).
Betweenness, therefore, is employed here to identify all actors that potentially
play an exceptional role in relational space. At a practical level, since most
political networks exhibit a strong core-periphery structure, rankings for
most centrality statistics converge; we have combined both medial and radial
centrality statistics (Borgatti, 2005; Borgatti and Everett, 2006) casting a wide net to
capture behaviors that entail seeking political balance (medial) or political support
(radial). Whether distant ties (an actor gains through brokerage) or strong ties
(gained through belonging to a cohesive group) are more effective in conveying
Table 1. Conceptual archetypes: distinguishing policy brokers from policy entrepreneurs
Brokers Entrepreneurs Operationalization
Action +
(Strategic)
+
(Opportunistic)
Betweenness centrality
Relational power/influence − + Positive Bonacich power
Relational power/control + − Negative Bonacich power
Structural hole advantage − + Burt effective size
Structural hole embedded + − Burt constraint
Pure brokerage + − Honest broker
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influence would be determined by tie resonance, which lies beyond the scope of the
present analysis.2
As stated already, the policy literature assumes that policy entrepreneurs
seek the aggrandizement of their political resources, while policy brokers are
assumed to take a more strategic perspective. In assessing their pursuit of power and
aggrandizement of political capital we have first considered the Bonacich measure.
Bonacich (1987) conditions the number of ties an actor has with the relational
power of his/her alters (for an application, see Ingold, 2009). Two configurations
are modeled depending on whether the presence of a tie implies that an agent’s
influence is affected by connecting to well or weakly connected others. A positive
effect can be associated with leveraging power by being connected to powerful
others, where the centrality of these alters augments the power of the focal actor.
A negative effect can be associated to the potential of central actors to dominate
relationally weak alters. Consistent with the policy literature, policy entrepreneurs
are seen as opportunistic, while policy brokers as strategic, the former by having
influential ties to central others (positive Bonacich power) that help them access
decision making and shape policy output more easily; the latter by cultivating
relations toward structurally weak alters (negative Bonacich power). Policy brokers
link structurally weak actors and enhance information flow and stability in the
policy network.
Ron Burt (1992, 2002, 2005) formalized the essential aspects of positional
advantage and disadvantage of individuals that result from how they are embedded
in their relational neighborhood. In exploiting so called structural holes, the
effective size of actor A’s network consists of all actors A is tied to and the relations
between them (Burt, 1992). The bigger the effective size of an actor’s structural hole
(i.e. absence of ties between alters), the more an actor can exploit his contacts to
impact policy change. We expect policy brokers (unlike network brokers) to have
low rank on effective size as they engage in trust building among network actors to
make political compromise feasible. We anticipate policy entrepreneurs to rank
high on effective size as they attempt to exploit structural advantage by exploiting
the lack of ties between their alters. A related measure is that of structural constraint
(ibid.). The algorithm evaluates the degree to which relations between alters
constrain ego. This is often associated to high levels of cohesion among ego’s alters
that limits A’s opportunity for playing one against another. Burt’s constraint can
be relevant to identifying policy entrepreneurs, who we would expect not to be
constrained by the relations among their alters.
Finally, honest brokerage calculates the degree to which brokers exclusively
connect their alters, that is, whether they are the only direct intermediary between
others (Ahuja, 2000; Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002). It is thus an apt statistic
2 A number of other centrality statistics like in and out degree are considered of less value to defining
agency. The combined use of positive with negative relations (Smith et al., 2014) although highly desirable is
limited by the dearth of negative tie networks.
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to evaluate policy brokers, conceived as singular trusted partners, in a highly
contested political setting.
The previous section gave an overview of conceptual insights from former work.
We proceed to validate our conceptual assumptions empirically. More concretely,
we wish to highlight whether different network measures are capable of reflecting
presumed differences between entrepreneurs and brokers in policy networks.
We validate this by testing our assumptions on cases where we have observed
unanticipated policy outcomes. We have identified brokers and entrepreneurs in a
case of SCP and EUC and Transport policy.
Cases, data, and methods
We chose these specific cases of EUC policy and SCP for several reasons: first, and as
stated earlier, identifying unanticipated exceptional policy outcomes serves as a
starting point in locating the agents that are presumably responsible. From previous
studies (Christopoulos, 2006; Ingold, 2011), we know that in both cases, policy
outputs were different than anticipated and can be therefore considered extra-
ordinary. Second, we chose those two cases for our analysis as we could, in
preliminary studies, classify them as ‘good examples’ of processes with a certain
degree of conflict where the action of entrepreneurs and brokers became crucial to
the policy outcomes. And finally, it seems appropriate to investigate agency
captured both in the actions of individual agents (i.e. EUC) and organizations (i.e.
SCP). We recognize that both systems have very different institutional settings and
policymaking specificities. Even though we are not conducting a comparative ana-
lysis, we wish to feature some specific network measures that highlight the differ-
ence between brokers and entrepreneurs, abstracting them from their respective
institutional and case-specific contexts. We even go one step further: as outlined
hereafter, the cases and data are inherently different. The Swiss case considers
organizations within a decade long policy process, while the EU case looks at
individuals during a 6-month phase of the policy cycle. By employing two dissimilar
cases, in a most different-systems-design, we aim to demonstrate the reliability of
this method in disentangling two different types of agency, policy brokerage, and
policy entrepreneurship.
Remarkable agency has been evident in EUC, a case of lobbying the EU to attain
a regulatory derogation to competition policy rules (Christopoulos, 2006). Two
political entrepreneurs were successful in forcing the EU Commission to backtrack
on an earlier decision to impose fines on one of them (actor 7). This retreat subse-
quently turned into a proper rout with the introduction of a derogation on a fun-
damental EU law prohibiting state subsidies to private enterprise.3 This substantial
change cannot be understood just by taking account of the political power of the
3 Originally article 87 of the EC Treaties and currently article 107 of the Treaty of the Functioning of
the EU.
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actors benefiting from this lobbying effort or from contrasting their economic sig-
nificance. Indeed, actors negatively affected, had higher economic and political
relevance. The latter included most major EU airlines and airports. Actors opposed
on principle to the changes had higher political capital (i.e. Directorate General for
Competition of the EU Commission) from those in favor of change. The success of
the political entrepreneurs directly reflected their structural position in the influence
network and their effectiveness at manipulating three important and interconnected
elements of interest intermediation. They managed to introduce a new dimension to
the policy agenda, elevate this dimension to prominence, and engineer a coalition of
interests that legitimized their interjection. They also managed, at a critical juncture
of agenda setting, to keep those with contesting interests peripheral to the policy
debate, and therefore reset the policy agenda. Brokers, just as Burt (2005) contends,
benefit both by bridging networks as well as sustaining structural holes. None
of the major airlines or other economic interests opposed to the changes were active
in the network depicted in Figure 1 which, in that respect, represents a cluster of
20 actors from a much wider policy community, albeit a cluster that was
Figure 1 Ryanair-Charleroi policy network at the agenda setting stages of the policy cycle
(June 2004). Ties represent reported influence between actors, multidimensional scaling graph.
White nodes are broker–entrepreneurs, dark gray are entrepreneurs, and light gray brokers.
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instrumental in bringing about policy change. The policy space was defined by a
series of key events organized around a lobbying effort as perceived by a number of
informants between January and June 2004.4
In the case of SCP, the ACF developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) was
applied and two opposing coalitions identified. The aim was to investigate a policy
change on the level of newly introduced instruments to mitigate climate change (see
Ingold, 2008, 2011). Therefore, the political elite, consisting of 34 actors repre-
senting political parties, interest groups, trade unions, federal agencies, and scien-
tific institutes were identified and interviewed. Coalitions were identified based on
structural equivalence measures in the ally/enemy network and through an in-depth
belief investigation. Between 2002 and 2005, the Swiss climate mitigation policy
was characterized through a pro-economy and a pro-ecology coalition: the first
preferring voluntary measures, the second a CO2 tax to mitigate climate change.
But no compromise could be found between the coalitions, and the Swiss govern-
ment debated between creating winners and losers on the one side or the other.
We considered this particular situation as ideal for studying the presence of entre-
preneurs and brokers. First, the voluntary measures being put on the political
agenda were very new and innovative solutions to reduce CO2 emissions in the
studied case. They were invented and then promoted by representatives from the
private sector. The presence of entrepreneurs could be one explanation for target
and interest groups framing policy intensively and so successfully. Second, we know
that the final output represents a compromise solution integrating, the preferred
instruments from both coalitions. This is an ideal setting for broker intervention to
seek stability in the subsystem and thus promote policy compromise. This particular
circumstance in the SCP case let us investigate entrepreneurship and brokerage over
one decade, investigating a period before, and one after, this important policy
change. Our analysis indicates that actors 16 and 31 (a political party and a Federal
Agency) decisively impacted the policy output, while some other actors (9, 28, 1,
and 30) were central in the network and managed to control information flow and
access to decision making (Figure 2; see also Appendix II for a list of actors).
SNA
We use the rank order in betweenness centrality scores as a ‘filter metric’
because it helps us to identify the actors with structural advantages within the
network from all other actors. Above average actors identified in the EUC case are:
7, 1, 17, 11, 21, 13, 8, 12, 5, 19. In SCP, the top quartile of rank ordered actors are:
28, 30, 31, 1, 16, 9, 14, 12, 32. From this point onwards, we concentrate
our analysis on these actors – corresponding to 1/2 of actors in the EUC policy,
4 Data for this study was collected through a small number of informants and represent the consensus
view of influence attempts during the agenda-setting policy phase (see Christopoulos, 2006).
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and 1/4 of actors in the SCP case – as those most likely to be policy entrepreneurs
and/or brokers.5
The brokerage profile of actors in these datasets (Tables 2 and 3) reveal a nuanced
picture of the roles and behaviour of the actors in these policy spaces. We group
them into four categories:
(1) Non-Exceptional (black): a group of actors (5, 12, 19 in the EUC case and 12, 14,
31 in SCP) are neither significant brokers nor important policy entrepreneurs.
They are active at this point of the policy cycle but show little evidence of
exceptionality. They lack substantial brokerage or relational advantage and are
mostly constrained by the relations of others.
(2) Policy Entrepreneurs (dark-gray): actors 11 and 17 in the EUC case, and actor 16 in
the SCP case, respectively, have low ‘honest brokerage’ impact but have high
potential to exploit structural holes as evident from their scores on Burt’s effective
size measure. At the same time, they are central actors with above average indicators
of influence and control over others (Bonacich). So, this group of actors are
structurally well embedded (high centrality), which affords them potential network
brokerage benefits (high Burt’s effective size), on which, however, they cannot
Figure 2 Swiss climate policy network in 2002–2005. Ties represent reported collaboration
between actors (directed graphs), multidimensional scaling graph. White nodes are broker–
entrepreneurs, dark gray are entrepreneurs, and light gray brokers.
5 The choice of how many actors to analyse depends on a pragmatic criterion. Including too many
would confuse the analysis. There is also an objective criterion. They need to be identified as somehow
remarkable. In line with the pragmatic criterion, we decided to limit the discussion to no more than
10 actors per case. All actors are indirectly included in the analysis as the network metrics employed reflect
relations among all agents.
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capitalize as their network lacks ‘true’ structural holes (low honest brokerage).
This contradictory stress indicates embedded mobilized agents. In that respect, the
political entrepreneurship of such agents mainly reflects their attempt to mobilize
others. This implies that in cases where we observe unanticipated policy outcomes, we
can also anticipate policy entrepreneurs attempting to mobilize relational resources.
(3) Policy Brokers (light-gray): a group of actors (8, 13, 21 in the EUC case and 1,
30 in SCP) demonstrate high honest brokerage but variation in other measures
of relational centrality. Actors 8 and 13 (Table 2) and actor 1 (Table 3) have
high measures of constraint, implying they are embedded in their relations
with other actors, while at the same time they have high brokerage scores.
They fit our theoretical assumption of actors with a stabilizing influence on the
network, as conduits of information and influence. Actor 13 (Table 2) and
Table 3. Broker relational profile, ‘Swiss Climate Policy’
Actor
number
Positive Bonacich –
influence
Negative Bonacich –
control
Burt effective
size
Burt
constraint
Honest
Broker
1 − + − + +
9 + + − + +
12 − − − + −
14 − − − + −
16 + + + − −
28 + + + − +
30 + − + − +
31 − − + − −
Positive signs indicate actors who rank in the top four among focal actors with the next four
marked negative. This typically corresponds to the first and second octile for this data set.
Brokerage scores correspond to the second time point in this data set.
Table 2. Broker relational profile, ‘Ryanair-Charleroi’
Actor
number
Positive Bonacich –
influence
Negative Bonacich –
control
Burt effective
size
Burt
constraint
Honest
Broker
1 + + + — +
5 − − − + −
7 + + + − +
8 − − − + +
11 + + + − −
12 − − − + −
13 + + − + +
17 + + + − −
19 − − − + −
21 − − + − +
Positive signs indicate actors who rank in the top five with the next five marked negative. This
typically corresponds to the first and second quartile for this data set. Brokerage scores reported
correspond to the second time point in this data set.
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again actor 1 (Table 3) are more central but lack effective brokerage to be
considered entrepreneurs. Actors 21 (Table 2) and 30 (Table 3) play a unique
brokerage role as evident from their honest brokerage ranks, but also have large
structural holes in their network, which limits the impact of their effectiveness
as policy brokers.
(4) Oscillating Broker–Entrepreneurs (white): actors 1 and 7 in the EUC case and actors
9 and 28 in the SCP case dominated the brokerage statistics confirming insights
from the case study analysis. They can be perceived as both stabilizing brokers and
opportunistic entrepreneurs. In both cases, these actors have altered the agenda to
benefit their own preferences and facilitated the establishment of a new balance of
power that maintained momentum for changes in the policy space. They are
‘honest’ brokers, invariably effective in their use of structural holes and at the same
time exhibit high levels of centrality.6 Their structural position reflects their power
in this policy space. Indeed, we hypothesize that the most exceptional of policy
actors are likely to be sensitive to the challenges of the relational environment
and oscillate between roles. Therefore, those that unambiguously fit into one
relational archetype can be considered predictable, while our ‘oscillating’
broker–entrepreneurs patently are not.
Of the brokerage statistics we employ, Bonacich power has a strong theoretical
justification for inclusion but generally did not provide differentiation of agent
roles. This could be a result of the loss of data in the binarization of actor ranks, but
also reflects the radial nature of the algorithm. We record weighted centrality, on
which actors in our data sets tend to be ranked high or low, on both measures.
Burt’s effective size and constraint clearly distinguish between actors in both data
sets, while honest brokerage, as our core medial centrality measure, offered an
unambiguous measure of impact that permitted a comparison with Burt’s measures
for a better understanding of the role of these actors. Using these measures con-
currently has allowed us to classify actors into theoretically meaningful categories
by exploring similarities between their brokerage and centrality scores.
Triangulating sociometrics with case study analysis
The detailed knowledge in the case studies and the role particular actors have played
in the respective policy process, can be triangulated and the results from the net-
work analysis validated with insights from a former qualitative analysis of the EUC
and the SCP cases.
In the EUC case, the central role within the influence network of actors 1 and 7
(oscillating broker–entrepreneurs) is evident from their position in this policy space.
These two actors resisted an EU Commission decision by instigating a policy
change and are identified as the policy entrepreneurs by all other agents within this
6 With the exception of actor 9 in the Swiss case who displays a rather high control over others.
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policy community. As the policy proceeded from a challenge of the old agenda to a
consultation on a new agenda, the centrality and brokerage of these two actors
gains in prominence. They became more central than could be anticipated from
their status and political capital alone, and embedded themselves to the center of the
policy space, as this crystallized into an effective challenge to the status quo. As an
aside, a number of classic lobbying strategies used before by all actors concerned, by
means of deploying prominent political agents to intermediate, had failed to sway
the EU Commission. Lobbying became effective when the political entrepreneurs
managed to successfully present themselves as the voice of wider industry interests
and the conduits of legitimate political concerns from European peripheral regions.
This they were able to do by successfully orchestrating the actions of other actors,
which allowed them to effectively leverage their political capital and punch above
their weight. They brokered an idea that originated with an actor from the epistemic
community (actor 18, Deutsche Bank) who provided scientific credibility to their
claim of a positive regional growth impact from economic state subsidies to private
corporations. At the same time, they coordinated influence toward actors 8 and
10 (EU Commission) from a number of disparate interests, such as regional gov-
ernments, regional airports, low cost airlines, and professional associations repre-
senting them. The success of actors 1 and 7 reflects their good understanding of the
relations between other actors, the advantage of brokering the opinions of
others and their effectiveness at blocking other actors from the policy debate.
They were exceptional by managing a concerted lobbying campaign, premised
on cultivating the relations of those sympathetic to their claims, and by making
their adversaries appear isolated and parochial from the perspective of the key
political agent with decisional power in this policy space, the EU Commission.
Their role is exceptional and we recognize here that actors 1 and 7 are both brokers
and political entrepreneurs during this time frame. Indeed, we hypothesize, they
were likely to oscillate between those roles and therefore potentially exhibit
exceptional behavior.
In SCP, the exceptional roles (oscillating brokers–entrepreneurs) of actors
9 (transport representative) and 28 (green NGO) confirm former results of SNA in
this case. Those actors were very active in the network, displaying a high number of
ties that may also explain their high centrality, influence, and control over others.
The added value of the analysis presented here is, that those two actors seem to
oscillate between both roles, of broker and entrepreneur. At the same time, we
observe a rather peripheral role of actors 12 and 14 (no brokerage): even though
those actors were important initiators of a new policy option, the voluntary mea-
sures to mitigate climate change, they did not have direct access to decision making
and were perceived as ‘traditional’ private sector lobbyists.7
7 Evidence of the difficulty in pigeonholing these agents is actor 31, in preliminary analysis identified as
one of the two important brokers in the network (Ingold, 2008), but who displays here a rather modest
brokerage role.
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The strategic role (indicated through high Bonacich power measures and Burt
effective size – thus categorized as entrepreneur) of actor 16 again confirms former
results: it is a center-right political party influential within Parliament and
Government. It was the actor bringing forward a feasible policy solution in this
arena and can, thus, be perceived as one decisive actor in the network that has acted
strategically (Ingold and Varone, 2011). Finally, the broker role of actors 1 and 30
was confirmed mainly through their high honest brokerage activity. They are the
most central actors in the network: the first is the most important representative of
the private sector, the second the Federal Agency for the Environment, guiding this
whole policy process. They are thus related to all actors in the network, which
impacts positively on their general brokerage role.
SNA has offered an insight on actors that are not as prominent as the
‘usual suspects’ of policy analysis, those agents with high levels of legitimacy and
power. It allowed us, therefore, to consider the impact of all actors on the policy
process. Comparing a range of different descriptive statistics, couched within
the theoretical assumptions of each one, has improved our understanding of the
role and impact of these actors on policy. We steered clear of the more advanced
techniques for predictive analysis with social network data, such as, MRQAPs,
ERGM, and Stochastic MCMC models as they are less appropriate for dealing
with an initial treatment of a theory building project (see Robins, Lewis and
Wang, 2012).
Discussion: on exceptionality, centrality, and brokerage elasticity
The starting point for this research was that SNA offers several measures that may
depict the conceptual difference that brokers and entrepreneurs have in policy-
making processes. Borrowed from policy process theories, the basic assumption was
that brokers and entrepreneurs search for different pathways to influence policy-
making (see also Dür, 2008), and are, thus, differently embedded in a policy net-
work as they display distinct relational profiles. Table 1 summarized the network
concepts and measures we used to highlight the difference among those two types of
agents. This has allowed us to go beyond an analysis of political agency as merely
the sum of actions of political agents.
As hypothesized, elementary centrality measures in general, and betweenness
centrality in particular, can differentiate those that are most engaged and likely to be
influential in a policy process. But there are several actors in a network displaying
high centrality without having a remarkable impact on the policy process. We
predicted that positive Bonacich power would fit the profile of policy entrepreneurs;
negative would fit the profile of policy brokers. We found, instead, that policy
entrepreneurs are actors who activate ties to both, well and poorly connected
others, in order to influence and/or control them. Concerning Burt’s positional
advantage and disadvantage measures, we got mixed results in both case studies.
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We conclude that effective size and constraint help identify those exploiting struc-
tural holes, but do not sufficiently disentangle policy brokerage from policy entre-
preneurship. Finally, the honest brokerage measure appears consistent for
identifying compromise seeking policy brokers: in contrast to entrepreneurs, bro-
kers in both case studies had high honest brokerage scores.
Congruent to our findings here, we would suggest that policy entrepreneurs are
central in both Bonacich power measures and have a structural hole advantage
through Burt’s effective size measure. Policy entrepreneurs therefore, have, at the
same time, high levels of centrality and high levels of network brokerage. Such a
relational profile implies informational advantage and high levels of influence.
Policy brokers rank high on honest brokerage, which implies that they are unique
interlocutors between different segments of a network. Making this distinction
allow us to disambiguate the agency of political brokers and entrepreneurs but also
to classify a new class of agency, which we term here as ‘exceptional’, to portray the
relational profile of those agents that oscillate between roles. The agents we have
here identified as exceptional, rank high on almost all the measures of centrality and
brokerage that we employ. Such agents appear to be central, connect different
clusters, and have a high proportion of their brokerage as ‘honest’. Exceptional
political agents score high on both network brokerage and network centrality,
which implies a structural position with potential contradictions. The case study
analysis has allowed us to confirm an intuition that these are actors that have
oscillated between roles. Exceptional agents not only have a structural advantage
but shift roles to suit the circumstance. This could make them difficult to predict for
their opponents while remaining a reliable source of information or influence for
their supporters. This reflects, to some degree, what Paddgett and Ansell (1993)
have termed ‘robust action’ to describe the type of control Cosimo de Medici
exercised on medieval Florentine politics. His role ambiguity translated into an
advantage in the same way that, in our cases studies, the exceptional agents appear
to be brokers for some of their alters and entrepreneurs to others.
There are a number of network contingent concepts that we consider relevant,
but for which we lack data to test our assumptions, such as network cognition and
network horizons. These could indicate directions for future work in the field. In
terms of network cognition, our assumption is that an accurate mental map of their
relational environment could provide a major advantage to political actors, being
related to insights from the theory of cognitive social structure (Krackhardt, 1999).
This could also enable a clearer differentiation between policy brokers and policy
entrepreneurs since the latter would need more accurate cognition of network
brokerage opportunities than the former.
We further assume that an agents’ network horizon could provide an advantage
(Friedkin, 1983). The theory here assumes that success depends on cognition of who
their associates are connected to, those that see further into their relational horizon
(Friedkin, 1998). Our assumption here is that policy brokers would need an accu-
rate view of the relations between alters of their own alters. So, in terms of cognition
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of network topology, policy entrepreneurs would have a better comprehension of
the ‘global’ network while policy brokers would be able to see the benefits they can
draw from their local networks (relations of their alters). The former would value
opportunities of information flow across different clusters in the relational topo-
graphy, while the latter, resource flows that can be reaped through strong ties.
We conclude that comparing network statistics provided a unique insight into
actors’ relational constraints and opportunities (Tables 2 and 3), which would not
have been possible from a cross-sectional design employing conventional policy
analysis. And we have also provided a theoretical justification to the old adage that
context matters. In policy environments with low levels of contestation, central
actors are powerful. Centrality does not directly translate into power in a frag-
mented and clustered policy space. Unanticipated policy outcomes result because
influence is harder for political actors to assess and power could lie with those that
broker influence between opposing clusters, or those that seek balance and com-
promise through group cohesion. In that respect, network analysis allows us to
directly reflect and theorize on issues of power and its dissemination in political
systems.
And a word of caution. The effects of agency on social structure, whether the
latter is conceived as an institution or a network of relations, are difficult to capture
on a cross-sectional design. A longitudinal analysis would be much preferable.
Furthermore, the descriptive analysis employed here adequately explores how social
structure impacts political agency, but for a further caveat. The relational behaviour
of political agents is rarely unidimensional. Indeed, the recognition that actors
interact in multiple, co-evolving, and parallel social worlds is neither novel nor
revolutionary. The analysis of such data is still at an early stage however. An interest
in complexity (Uhl-Bien et al., 2008) and attention in the analysis of agency in
tandem with structure, objects, values, beliefs, and events (Carley, 2009) indicates
the future for explanatory and predictive social science.
As far as descriptive SNA is concerned, future research should explore further the
elasticity of brokerage based on our claim that exceptional actors oscillate between
roles. This we assume allows them to suit specific relational situations and task
demands. Network analysis is conducive to capturing power relations as it can be
employed to contingently consider information, reputation, support, and conflict
information as reflected in the relations of policy makers. As demonstrated here, it is
also consistent with method and data triangulation.
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Appendix I. Graph Theory Algorithms and their theoretical implications in Policy Analysis
Measure Formula Explanations to formula Implications in Policy Analysis
Betweenness
centrality
P
j<k
gjk ðni Þ
gjk
ðg1Þðg2Þ
2
ni = vertex i
j,k = vertexes j and k
gjk (ni ): number of geodesics between j and
k on which ni can be found
Betweenness measures the number of times an actor is located on
the path between two other actors in the political network.
Actors with high betweenness centrality could be brokers or
entrepreneurs as they occupy a potentially privileged position
in network structure. Reflects the degree to which the whole
network is dependent on an agent (medial), while retaining a
measure of their local centrality (radial).
Positive Bonacich
power
αðIβRÞ1R1 Bonacich also used an iterative estimation
approach, which weights each node’s
centrality by the centrality of the other
nodes to which it is connected
β = scaling vector, which is set to
normalize the score
α = attenuation factor that weights the
centrality of people ego is tied to.
Typically set to the inverse of the
maximal eigenvector
R = adjacency matrix
I = identity matrix (1s down the diagonal)
and 1 is a matrix of all ones
Bonacich assumes that the power and centrality of each node
(actor) depends on the power and centrality of their alters
A positive Bonacich power weight implies that being connected
to well-connected network neighbors increases an actor’s
influence. This might be particularly relevant in policy
networks when an actor does not have formal decisional
power. This can also capture the presumed influence of those
next to prominent (i.e. central) actors
To the degree that ties reflect power relations, being connected to
powerful others can entail advantages as well as constraints
Negative Bonacich
power
αðIβRÞ1R1 Same as above, just that for negative
Bonacich, one uses a negative attenuation
factor α
Negative Bonacich power reflects the case where the power of
the focal actor is constrained by the power of those they are
connected to
It can capture the degree to which an actor is ‘exploited’ or
‘dominated’ by the centrality of their alters and of course
depends on the nature of captured relations
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Appendix I. (Continued )
Measure Formula Explanations to formula Implications in Policy Analysis
Burt effective size P
j
1P
q
piqmjq
" #
i = vertex i
j = all of the people that ego i
q = every third person other than i or j
Piq is the proportion of actor i’s relations
that are spent with q
mjq is the marginal strength of contact j’s
relation with contact q. Which is j’s
interaction with q divided by j’s strongest
interaction with anyone
The sum of the product piqmjq measures
the portion of i’s relation with j that is
redundant to i’s relation with other
primary contacts
The quantity (piqmjq) inside the brackets is
the level of redundancy between ego and
a particular alter, j
Conceptually the effective size is the number of people ego is
connected to, minus the redundancy in the network, that is, the
non-redundant elements of the network
Effective size = size− redundancy
The bigger the effective size of an actor’s network, the more an
actor can exploit his contacts to impact policy change
An actor with a high score is connecting others that are not
connected among themselves
Burt constraint ðpij +
P
q piqpqiÞ2 Direct investment (Pij) + indirect
investment
Given the p matrix, indirect constraint
(piqpqj) can be calculated with the 2-step
path distance
(see also, Borgatti, 2005)
Conceptually, constraint refers to how much room you have to
negotiate or exploit potential structural holes in your network.
The less constraint an actor experiences from his/her
neighborhood, the more he/she has the potential to engage in
strategic action within the policy network
High levels of constraint imply that an actor’s alters are
connected to one another. The implication is that brokerage
rents (say from acting as a gatekeeper) cannot be levied when
connecting others. The measure also implies that action is
restricted by the norms within a group. Actors with high levels
of constraint could also be the beneficiaries of high levels of
cohesion within their network, that is, social capital
Politicalentrepreneurs
and
brokers
in
policy
m
aking
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Appendix I. (Continued )
Measure Formula Explanations to formula Implications in Policy Analysis
Honest Broker gi{j,k...}
gi = HB0i +HB1i+HB2i
HB0i = gi− (HB1i +HB2i)
HB0i ¼
P
g
j≠ k
gni
Alternatively this can be
seen as a triadic relation
solved for j
HB0i ¼
P
Tijk
gj
where <ni, nk>≠Lj
gi = all lines between i and their alters j,
k…
HB0 number of alters that have no tie to
one another divided by total number of ties
This is the Null dyad between j k for all (j,k)
who are alters of i
HBI number of alters that have one directed
tie by total
HB2number of alters that have reciprocal ties
by total
Lj is the set of lines within distance 2 of j
Honest brokerage calculates the degree to which an actor is the
exclusive broker for his/her alters. It gives an indication of how
many times an actor is the single intermediary between two of
their alters
An actor with high honest brokerage can have singular control
over information and, depending on the number of their
connections, could play an instrumental role in the
dissemination of all information content. This statistic
represents a theoretically precise description of positional
advantage but requires caution in its use as it should be
normalized for network size, density and agent activity
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Appendix II. Actors’ list of ‘Ryanair-Charleroiʼ
1 Assembly of the European Regions
2 Assembly of the European Regions
5 EU Committee of the Regions
7 Ryanair Airline
8 EU DG Transport
9 EU Committee of the Regions
10 EU DG Competition
11 ELFAA The European Low Fares Airline Association
(association of airlines)
12 ARC Airport Regions Conference
(association of regional and local authorities)
13 Charleroi Airport Authority
14 Strasbourg Airport Authority
16 Waloon Regional Government
17 FARE Forum of European Regional Airports
18 Deutsche Bank Research
19 Pisa Airport Authority
20 Pau Airport Authority
21 Ryanair Airline
22 Ryanair Airline
23 Waloon Regional Government
24 Catalan Regional Government
Appendix III. Actors’ list of Swiss Climate Policy
1 Economiesuisse, Swiss Business Federation
2 Swiss Association of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry
3 Swiss Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Industries
4 Association of the Swiss Cement Industry
5 Swiss Houseowner Association
6 Association for Ecology Integration in Business Management
7 Swiss Touring Club
8 Association for Transport and Environment
9 Road Traffic Association
10 Swiss Federation of Trade Unions
11 Association of Trade Unions
12 Energy Agency for the Economy
13 Agency for Renewable Energy
14 Petrol Union
15 Energieforum
16 Christian Democratic People’s Party
17 Free Democratic Party
18 Social Democratic Party of Switzerland
19 Swiss People’s Party
20 Green Party of Switzerland
21 Prognos-Private Scientific Organization
22 Infras-Private Scientific Organization
23 Factor AG, Private consultant firm
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Appendix III. (Continued )
24 Forum for Global and Climate Change
25 Advisory Board on Climate Change
26 Swiss National Science Foundation Competence Centre on Climate Change
27 Greenpeace
28 World Wildlife Fund Switzerland
29 Equiterre-Green NGO
30 Swiss Federal Office for the Environment
31 Swiss Federal Office of Energy
32 State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
33 Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communications
34 Federal Finance Administration
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